The Bolaji Akinyemi Debate – By Akin Osuntokun 

Caught in the syndrome of Berthold Brecht’s observation that ‘unlucky is the nation without a hero but unhappy is the one that is in need of heroes’, the towering Nigerian political science scholar, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, easily fell prey to the fad of over romanticising Nigeria’s past especially as it regards the virtuous cosmopolitan behaviour of political leaders which is relentlessly misinterpreted as nationalism.

Giving the Etteh annual distinguished lecture (NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND INTEGRATION AS CATALYST FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT )- suffused with an array of atypical instances such as Umaru Altine becoming a mayor in Enugu, He ponders ‘New words have crept into our political lexicon such as power rotation, our turn, quota, catchment area, federal character, etc. From the beginning of political activism in Nigeria, until 1999, roughly for a period of about 150 years, there were several federal elections involving the Founding Fathers, namely Tafawa Balewa, Obafemi Awolowo, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Shehu Shagari and not once was an election fought on the basis of “it’s our turn” or “power rotation” or any such abracadabra lexicon. Yet, in 1999, the military government at that time decided to award the presidency to the South-west on a rotation basis thereby introducing a new pernicious term into Nigerian politics’.

This is a misinterpretation of the history of Nigeria which can only provide a wrong premise and a wrong formulation of Nigeria’s political dilemma. It is true that prior to 1999, no federal election was explicitly predicated on what would otherwise qualify as affirmation principles (such as power rotation) but this is not an indication that Nigeria was better politically integrated in the First and Second Republic. Rather it was because the First Republic did not even recognise the need for national integration as a worthy challenge. I am not aware there was a single constitutional provision aimed at fostering national unity as you will find, for instance, in the national youth service corps scheme.

On the contrary, you do find a situation in which the dominant political party, the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) explicitly and defiantly identified itself as a regional party-whose primary loyalty to the Northern region overrides any fidelity to Nigeria. Hot on its heels was the Western Region where the Action Group (AG) was essentially the English name for the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. Given the unabashed revelation of itself as a regional party, what else does the NPC need to do to get across the message that its participation in any election is solely founded on Northern supremacy and Northern interests? In place of power rotation the vocabulary then was along the more pernicious lines of ‘the mistake of 1914 has come to light’.

Ditto for Obafemi and Awolowo and the Action Group. The reluctant Nigerian that he was, Awolowo set out in his intellectual awakening (path to Nigeria freedom) by recognising and concluding that Nigeria was no more than a mere geographical expression. In cue what did the Western Region (or the politicians) of 1951 make of the singular opportunity to truly birth Nigerian nationalism? Was Nnamdi Azikiwe not denied the opportunity to become the first Western regional premier (when his party won the majority parliamentary seats) on the altar of Yoruba irredentism? And did Azikiwe (the initial Nigerian nationalist stalwart) not eventually find the ethnic card irresistible when he had Eyo Ita step down for him in order that oyingbo might become the premier of the Eastern Region?

Considering the role he played in the crisis that precipitated the recourse to the power rotation template in 1999, it is rather puzzling that Akinyemi now thinks so poorly of the inherent conflict resolution utility of this contrivance. Power rotation was a specific response to the crisis generated by the annulment of the 1993 presidential election won by Moshood Abiola and a general response to the desperation among power blocs seeking the control of the central government. The decision to concede the presidency to the South-west was more a moot point of national political consensus than the dictatorship of the incumbent military government. And even at that it was not a walk in the park, shoo in, concession.

There were such contra indications as the competitiveness of the PDP primaries between Olusegun Obasanjo and Alex Ekwueme and the repeat performance of this intraparty slugfest in the primaries leading to the re-election of Obasanjo in 2003. If anyone or anything should be blamed for the elevation of the power rotation notion to the level of paramount objective, it was the decision to abort its more voluntary and evolutionary emergence in the presidential election victory of Abiola in the 1993 elections. It was the annulment of Abiola’s victory that promoted and precipitated power rotation as a political imperative.
Yet the proposition is true that the most successful phase of Nigeria’s history was the one terminated on the 15th of January 1966 but what accounted for this success was the rigorous application of federalism. The singular reason why this phase succeeded so well, especially in the province of socio-economic development, was the latitude provided in the operative federalism that precludes the anxiety of feeling threatened by one another. The Sardauna made this point sufficiently clear in his objection to the notion of Southerners coming to fill vacancies in the public service of the Northern region. It was a similar threat perception that largely accounted for the violent eruption in the West when the federal government of Tafawa Balewa intervened on the side of Premier Ladoke Akintola. In particular it was this perception that accounted for the mass slaughter of the Igbos in the North and ultimately the counter coup when JTU Aguiyi Ironsi promulgated the unification decree.