“My Cement Was Stronger and Cheaper”, Cletus Ibeto vs. Nigeria’s Cement Order

Cletus Ibeto’s charge is simple and incendiary: his cement was better and far cheaper than Dangote’s, but envy and political muscle, allegedly routed through President Olusegun Obasanjo, shut his factory down. He says if his plant were still running, no Nigerian would be paying today’s punishing prices; in his words, the market would never have gone beyond ₦2,500 per 50kg bag. That claim speaks to a popular pain point: cement is now a luxury for many aspiring home-builders.

Before we take sides, it’s worth unpacking what we can verify, and what it would take to genuinely make cement affordable again.

What Ibeto alleges

Ibeto says his product out-performed on quality and price, and that a deliberate policy squeeze, engineered to create dominance, forced him out, with knock-on effects that “crippled the South-East,” a region where self-build culture is strong. These are his assertions. They resonate because prices hurt, and because Nigerians have seen sectors tilt toward a few players before.

What the record shows

Policy backdrop (BIP): Nigeria adopted a Backward Integration Policy (BIP) for cement in 2002. The idea: give import licences and incentives to firms that invest in local plants, to move the country from imports to domestic production. The policy granted tax/duty waivers for machinery and tied import rights to evidence of real factory investments. This fundamentally reshaped the market structure.

Obasanjo-era closure: Multiple reports indicate that during the Obasanjo years, Ibeto’s bagging/import operation was shut on grounds of alleged “misrepresentation” around incentives. Later, under President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, the government allowed Ibeto back in with a compensatory import concession.

Court and ministry fights (2012–2016): As shortages persisted, a 2012 Federal High Court settlement enabled Ibeto to import up to 1.5 million tonnes to bridge supply. Dangote Cement went to court to stop it; the federal government at the time publicly criticized that suit as “anti-competitive.” Cases and appeals lingered for years.

Market structure today: Nigeria now has an oligopoly anchored by three producers (Dangote, BUA, Lafarge), with Dangote frequently estimated around ~60% market share. That concentration gives cost pass-through power, especially when energy, transport, FX, and logistics spike.

In short: Ibeto’s difficulties happened within a deliberate policy shift toward local production that rewarded players able to build big, capital-intensive plants, and disadvantaged import-led rivals. Whether that shift necessarily required squeezing him out is the controversy that still burns.

Price reality check (Nigeria vs. Ghana)

Nigeria (2024): After a public outcry, the federal government met manufacturers in February 2024; the parties announced a ₦7,000–₦8,000 target per 50kg bag (location-dependent). Retail prices often drifted higher in practice due to FX, fuel, and haulage, but that peg shows official recognition that prices had run away.

Ghana (2024): Retail prices generally ranged around GHS 82–105 per 50kg bag in mid-2024 (roughly fluctuating in naira with exchange rates). That’s not the naira-equivalent ₦5,000 some social posts claim; the Ghana figure has also been under pressure from inflation and costs.

So Ibeto’s “₦2,500 cap” is aspirational and politically powerful, but far below recent cost realities across West Africa.

Was Ibeto’s cement “stronger”?

Cement strength is primarily about grade (e.g., 32.5 vs 42.5 vs 52.5) and quality control, not brand name. Nigeria’s top producers (including importers/baggers when permitted) can all sell higher grades when inputs and standards are in place. Without publicly available, independent, like-for-like test data from the same period and grades, “stronger” remains an assertion, not a settled fact. The real consumer issue is consistent grade and honest labelling, areas where stronger standards and enforcement help everyone.

Did policy create dominance?

BIP undeniably picked winners, firms that could mobilize billions, secure gas/coal, and build kilns at scale. It also improved self-sufficiency, jobs, and investment. But the flip side of rapid indigenization under protection is limited rivalry: high tariffs on imports and clinker, FX scarcity, and logistics bottlenecks can entrench an oligopoly and make price spikes stickier. That’s the crux of the public anger: people feel captive to a tight market.

What would actually drop prices now (with or without Ibeto)?

1. Targeted, time-boxed competition at the margin. Allow measured imports (cement or clinker) when domestic prices breach a cost-plus trigger, via transparent quotas or variable tariffs, to discipline the market without killing local plants. (Nigeria did a version of this in 2012 during shortages.)
2. Lower energy and haulage costs. Cement is energy-hungry and heavy. Prioritize cheaper gas to plants, stabilize industrial diesel supply, and fast-track rail freight from limestone belts to demand centers. Every ₦ saved on fuel and trucking shows up in the bag price.
3. Open-access infrastructure. Ensure fair access to gas pipelines, export jetties, and rail sidings so no single player controls essential bottlenecks.
4. Standards and transparency. Enforce grade/weight standards and publish a weekly ex-factory vs. average retail price dashboard by state. Sunlight curbs gouging.
5. Level tax/duty treatment. Rationalize VAT/duties on inputs (gypsum, spare parts, refractory bricks) and ensure reforms benefit all compliant producers, incumbent or new.
6. Encourage new entrants & expansions. Fast approvals for brownfield debottlenecking, genuine greenfield entrants, and regional niche producers (including the South-East) so supply diversity improves.

These practical steps matter more to household budgets than relitigating a 20-year feud, though accountability and fair play still matter.

Bottom line

Ibeto’s story, of a cheaper product forced out by power games, captures a real public grievance, but many of its sharpest claims remain allegations.

The documented history shows Obasanjo-era shutdowns, later concessions under Yar’Adua, protracted court fights, and a policy (BIP) that built local capacity while hardening an oligopolistic market.

Prices won’t sustainably fall to ₦2,500 without energy, logistics, and competitive pressure moving in the right direction, backed by transparent regulation.

If the goal is affordable housing, the path is less about personalities and more about policy levers that restore credible rivalry and crush avoidable costs.

Sources for key facts: Reuters; AllAfrica reports on the Obasanjo closure and 2012–2013 import/court episodes; Nigerian press coverage of the 2024 price-peg meetings; and sector studies on the BIP and market structure.

Duruebube Uzii na Abosi

http://www.oblongmedia.net