There is corruption in Nigeria. There is no doubt about that. What is far less certain is whether Nigeria actually fights corruption or merely stages corruption dramas for public consumption. No modern Nigerian case better illustrates this uncomfortable question than the long running global spectacle surrounding Diezani Alison Madueke.

For over a decade, her name has been deployed like a headline weapon. Mention it anywhere and the reaction is instant. Outrage. Certainty. Condemnation. Yet when one strips away the noise, the emotional framing, and the politically convenient storytelling, a harder question emerges. Is this truly the most clearly proven grand corruption case Nigeria has ever produced, or is it the most successfully sensationalised one.

The public narrative has been simple and relentless. Former oil minister. Luxury lifestyle. London properties. Jewellery. Private jets. Billions whispered, rarely documented in court judgments. But the actual legal architecture behind the foreign prosecutions tells a more technical and less cinematic story. Much of what has been pursued abroad has centered on alleged bribery benefits and civil asset forfeiture, not a completed Nigerian criminal conviction establishing that specific sums were directly stolen from the Nigerian treasury by her personal hand.

That distinction is not a technicality. It is the difference between proven theft and alleged improper benefit. Between a criminal conviction and a civil recovery action. Between a final judgment and a prosecutorial theory.

Lost in the noise is also the inconvenient biography that complicates the lazy caricature. Diezani did not emerge from obscurity into oil power. She was born into an oil industry household, her father was a Shell executive, and she grew up in the then elite and still ultra trendy Shell residential estate in Port Harcourt. She attended top tier schools abroad, including Howard and Cambridge, returned to work with Shell, and rose through the ranks into executive leadership as a Niger Delta professional in a multinational oil environment. She was later appointed minister of transport under President Yar’Adua, then oil minister under President Jonathan, becoming the first female Nigerian oil minister and the first female president of OPEC. That is no small résumé in a male dominated global industry. Such a trajectory is not only historic, it is also, in elite power circles, a ready made recipe for rivalry, resentment, envy, and institutional pushback, especially when followed by attempts to reorder a perennially opaque oil system.

Yet in the court of Nigerian public opinion, nuance was buried long ago under a mountain of sensational headlines.

Why.

Because Diezani became useful.

Useful as a symbol of the Jonathan era. Useful as a trophy for foreign enforcement agencies eager to demonstrate global reach. Useful for domestic political actors who needed a villain large enough to anchor an anti corruption narrative. Useful for media systems that run on outrage velocity, not evidentiary nuance.

In a country where dozens of politically exposed persons have faced sprawling allegations involving state treasuries, inflated contracts, missing local government funds, abandoned constituency projects, and vanished intervention budgets, it is remarkable how many of those cases move slowly, quietly, endlessly adjourned, endlessly deferred. Some collapse. Some mutate. Some disappear into plea bargains and political realignments. But they rarely receive the same sustained global theatrical treatment.

So the question is unavoidable. Why this case. Why this volume. Why this persistence of spectacle.

Part of the answer lies in oil. Nigerian oil is not just an industry. It is the command center of patronage, geopolitics, and elite entitlement. Any minister who significantly reshuffles access, licensing patterns, lifting rights, or indigenous participation automatically steps on invisible but very powerful toes. The oil ecosystem is layered with multinational interests, entrenched domestic blocs, legacy networks, and political financiers. Disruptions there do not end politely.

Another part of the answer lies in disruption of hierarchy. There has long been resentment within certain elite circles about efforts to expand indigenous operator participation and reduce the historical dominance of a narrow club of beneficiaries. Whether one agrees with how that process was handled or not, it undeniably altered relationships and expectations. Those displaced rarely forgive quietly.

Then there is the gender factor that polite commentators prefer to tiptoe around. Nigeria is still deeply uncomfortable with women who accumulate hard power in strategic sectors. A powerful woman in oil and OPEC space was always going to be judged more harshly, remembered more bitterly, and punished more symbolically than many of her male counterparts. Not because women are cleaner. But because powerful women are treated as trespassers.

None of this is a declaration of innocence. It is a demand for proportional scrutiny.

If the anti corruption war is real, it must be even handed. If gifting, influence peddling, and benefit culture in high office are crimes, then they must be crimes across the board, not selectively elevated into global morality plays when politically convenient. If evidence is overwhelming, then the gold standard is swift, clean, domestic criminal conviction based on documented treasury loss and unlawful personal gain, not decade long media trials backed mainly by foreign proceedings and negotiated forfeitures.

Nigeria must also confront an awkward institutional truth. Its anti graft agencies repeatedly complain of underfunding, weak prosecution capacity, and procedural bottlenecks. Major corruption cases stall for years. Files pile up. Witnesses vanish. Governments change. Priorities shift. Yet somehow, in the middle of this systemic weakness, one case is able to generate sustained international theatre for over ten years. That contrast deserves investigation, not applause.

Sensationalism is not justice. Volume is not proof. Repetition is not conviction.

When a society allows media narrative to outrun courtroom findings, it replaces rule of law with rule of storyline. Today it is Diezani. Tomorrow it will be someone else. The pattern will remain unless Nigerians begin to ask harder questions, not only about the accused, but about the accusers, the timing, the selectivity, and the political utility of outrage.

The real scandal may not be that one former minister is being prosecuted abroad. The real scandal may be that Nigeria still lacks a corruption prosecution system credible enough, consistent enough, and fearless enough to make foreign courtrooms unnecessary.

Until that changes, every high profile corruption case will carry a shadow question behind it.

Is this justice.

Or is this theatre.

By Hon. Chima Nnadi-Oforgu
Duruebube Ndukaku III of Ihiagwa ófó asato

http://www.oblongmedia.net

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